An instrumental variables model of state and local tax incidence is estimated for the years 1977, 1985, and 1991. Tax exporting through deductibility of state and local taxes has a signifi cant positive effect on tax progressivity. I fi nd a negative neighbor effect, with more progressive states geographically contiguous with more regressive states. Party control by Republicans is associated with a more regressive tax structure. Expenditure and tax progressivity are not closely related to one another, with higher welfare spending fi nanced by proportionally higher tax burdens throughout the income distribution. Greater inequality in pre-tax income distributions is offset by more progressive tax systems, but the degree of offset is small.
INTRODUCTION
D espite the standard fi scal federalist prescription that state and local governments cannot engage in redistribution, there is substantial variation across states in the distributional incidence of both taxes and spending. While overall statelocal tax systems are regressive, in 1991 the most progressive state-local tax system was more than three times as progressive as the least. The standard deviation of progressivity was equal to a third of the mean (Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ), 1991). In this paper, I estimate an empirical model to determine the role of various economic and political factors in the choice of tax progressivity across states. Factors include tax exportation through federal tax deductibility, interstate tax competition, the distributional incidence of state and local expenditures, the level and distribution of income, and the political party composition of states. The model is estimated using state and local incidence data for 1976, 1985, and 1991. State and local taxes are important in magnitude-in 1995 they equaled 11.3 percent of personal income. Hence, variations in their incidence will have a signifi cant impact on the overall distributional incidence of the public sector. However, most research on tax incidence has focused on either measurement or normative aspects. There has been relatively little positive analysis of subnational progressivity in federalist systems. Explaining this variation is important to our understanding of fi scal federalism and, in particular, the equity implications of further devolution of fi scal responsibilities from the national to the state level.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section briefly discusses previous literature. The second section presents the empirical model. The third section discusses data and estimation issues. Results are presented in the fourth section, which is followed by a brief conclusion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The political science literature contains several studies of state and local tax progressivity. Jacobs and Waldman (1983) fi nd that greater income inequality leads to more progressive tax systems, while a higher percentage of blacks is associated with more regressivity. Morgan (1995) fi nds that a better informed electorate, as measured by newspaper circulation, has a negative effect on tax progressivity. Berch (1995) shows that the number of years of democratic control of the governorship has a positive effect on progressivity, while Lowery (1987) fi nds that the degree of political competition is positively associated with the degree of tax progressivity. Other studies by political scientists are discussed below.
Economists have focused on tax exporting in explaining variations in the shares of various state taxes in state revenues (Gade and Adkins, 1990; Metcalf, 1993) . Their work is relevant to the analysis of tax incidence because of the strong correlation between tax shares and tax incidence. 1 Metcalf (1993) fi nds that tax exporting through the deductibility of state and local taxes from the federal income tax is important in explaining both the share and level of income taxation, but it does not explain the share and level of the sales tax. In his work, the decisive voter group for the income tax is estimated to be above the 90 th percentile of the income distribution, while the decisive group for the sales tax is closer to the middle. Metcalf's (1993) results suggest that the imposition of relatively progressive state taxes is heavily dependent on the ability to shift burdens via deductibility. Chernick (1992) analyzes incidence directly, but based on only a single year of data. Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (2002) investigate the relationship between progressivity on the tax side, as measured by reliance on the income tax, and the expenditure side, and fi nd the two to be complementary. The Bahl et al. (2002) study is discussed further below. Table 1 provides summary data on the tax incidence in U.S. states, both overall and by region. As a measure of incidence, I use the ratio of the tax burden, gross of federal deductibility, in the highest quintile of a state's income distribution to the tax burden the lowest quintile. This measure is discussed extensively below. The ratio was 0.66 in 1977, 0.69 in 1985 and 1981, and 0.71 in 1995. Thus, in a typical state, the top quintile of taxpayers paid about 30 percent less in state-local taxes as a fraction of their income than the bottom quintile. The coeffi cient of variation in progressivity was substantial, equaling 12 percent in 1976, 29 percent in 1985, 31 percent in 1991, and 25 percent in 1995 . The South has the most regressive tax systems and the least variation across states. 1 The income tax share is strongly correlated with the degree of progressivity in state and local tax systems, while greater shares for sales and excise taxes imply a more regressive structure. Based on the data for this study, 58 percent of the variation in state-local tax incidence can be explained by the income and sales tax shares. Figure 1 displays the geographic patterns of average progressivity in each state over the period 1977 to 1995. The map shows that regressive states are found in each region of the country, as are relatively progressive states. In some instances neighboring states have similar patterns of incidence, while in other cases highly progressive states border highly regressive states. The empirical model will include a test for the spatial relationship between geographic neighbors.
MODELING STATE AND LOCAL TAX INCIDENCE

Descriptive Data on State and Local Tax Incidence
Empirical Model
In their choice of state and local taxes, politicians are assumed to choose an incidence pattern that minimizes the political costs of raising a given amount of revenue. 2 In equilibrium, the marginal cost of raising the tax rate on a given income group will be equated to the additional revenue from the tax increase. The additional revenue depends on the size of the tax base and on the elasticity of the base with respect to the tax rate. Variables in the model are interpreted as affecting either the political costs of taxation or the elasticities of the tax base for different income groups.
States vary substantially in the relative importance of state versus local taxes, and the incidence pattern is in part a refl ection of this choice. 3 
Figure 1.
Progressivity of the Tax Burden (Average for Years 1977, 1985, 1989, and 1995) Progressivity: The empirical model, with the expected effect on progressivity in parentheses, can be summarized as follows:
PCTITEM, the percentage of tax fi ling units that itemizes, is a measure of the exportability of state and local taxes through federal tax deductibility. Itemization lowers the marginal tax price for deductible taxes from one to one minus the federal marginal tax rate. Because the likelihood of itemizing is strongly correlated with a taxpayer's income, the greater the fraction of taxpayers who itemize, the lower is the marginal tax price for taxpayers with incomes above the median for the state. The reduced tax price reduces the elasticity of the high-income tax base, leading to higher relative tax burdens on high-income taxpayers. 5 I assume that state tax choices are infl uenced by the tax behavior of adjacent states. 6 NEIGHBOR PROGRESSIVITY is defi ned as the weighted average progressivity of state and local taxes in a state's geographic neighbors. A substantial litera-ture suggests that tax mimicking, defi ned as a positive relationship between tax changes in one jurisdiction and changes in competitor jurisdictions, is widespread. Mimicking behavior between states has been found for income tax rates (Case, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995) and average tax burdens (Besley and Case, 1995) . For the local property tax, Ladd (1992) fi nds evidence of positive mimicking between counties, and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) find a similar pattern between municipalities. Rork (2003) fi nds evidence of positive mimicking behavior between states for excise taxes and the corporate income tax, but a negative relationship for income and sales tax rates. He argues that the difference refl ects differences in mobility of the various tax bases, with the income and sales tax base assumed to be less mobile than the excise tax base.
The model presented here tests for the extent to which the entire tax structure of a state, as summarized by its distributional incidence ratio, is influenced by the structure in adjoining states. I expect a positive effect for NEIGHBOR PROGRESSIVITY, with geographically contiguous states resembling each other in terms of distributional incidence. Other things equal, if taxes are more regressive in neighboring states, the net fi scal benefi t to high-income taxpayers of locating in those states should be enhanced relative to the home state. This should increase the elasticity of the high-income portion 4 The link between state and local taxes comes primarily through the level of state aid to school districts. State aid, which is in turn related to the level of state taxes, is a partial substitute for local taxes (Yinger and Ladd, 1989) . The incidence of local taxation is complicated by the fact that rates vary substantially across jurisdictions, and may be positively or negatively correlated with jurisdictional income levels (Chernick and Reschovsky, 1982) . This complication is not fully accounted for in the incidence studies used here, since they treat the local property tax as a uniform tax across the state. 5 For deductible state and local taxes, the marginal tax price for any fi ler is (1 -D*FMTR), where D is one if the taxpayer is an itemizer, and zero otherwise. The average marginal tax price for a given slice i of a state's income distribution would be [1 -P i (1 -FMTR i )], where P is the proportion of i that itemizes, and FMTR is the average marginal tax rate among itemizers in i. The average marginal tax price for the state would be [1 -P(1 -FMTR item )]. This latter measure is used by (Metcalf, 1993) . The appropriate federal marginal tax rates were not available for the entire sample period. However, the overall percentage itemizing is highly correlated with each of these measures. 6 Since every state is a neighbor to some other state, non-contiguous states will still have an indirect infl uence on a given state, but the major effect is through immediate neighbors.
of the tax base, leading to a reduction in own-state progressivity. Even if locational choice is relatively inelastic with respect to tax incidence, the political costs of a given distribution of burdens may change if, as argued by Besley and Case (1995) , taxpayers use neighbor tax rates as a yardstick for evaluating their own taxes. 7 Previous studies have found that a substantial degree of party control is necessary to enact significant changes in tax structure (Berch, 1995; Berry and Berry, 1994) . Hence, REPUBLICAN (DEMOCRAT) takes a value of one if the governor is a Republican (Democrat), and Republicans (Democrats) are in the majority in both legislative houses, and zero otherwise. The omitted category is a divided government. The predicted effect on progressivity of REPUBLICAN is negative, because the marginal political cost of an increase in tax burdens on highincome taxpayers is expected to be higher than the marginal cost of an increase for low-income taxpayers. Relative marginal costs are reversed under democratic control, so a positive sign is expected for DEMOCRAT.
If states differ in their underlying taste for redistribution, then it will be effi cient to use both expenditures and taxes to achieve a desired incidence pattern. Bahl et al. (2002, p. 727) argue that expenditure and tax shares are likely to be complementary, because "it makes intuitive sense that individuals who advocate expanded redistributive services will not want those services fi nanced with regressive taxes." Hence, if measures of redistribution are correlated with tastes, we expect a positive relationship between expenditure progressivity and tax progressivity. However, if it were possible to hold constant the taste for redistribution, then tax and expenditure progressivity could be substitutes. Suppose that there is an exogenous shift in expenditure incidence, for example from a court-mandated reduction in education spending disparities, or from a federal mandate to provide more medical services to low-income families. In this case, extra spending in poor school districts or additional medical services to low-income families might be fi nanced by an increase in regressive taxes. Even with no exogenous shocks, the desired degree of redistribution could remain the same, while preferences regarding the components of the redistributional package could change over time. In such a case, a state might choose to increase state aid to poor school districts, but fi nance the increased spending by an increase in regressive taxes.
It is diffi cult to capture the distributional impact of state and local expenditures in a single measure. As a proxy for pro-poor expenditure patterns, Bahl et al. (2002) use the share of state-local expenditures for welfare and elementary and secondary education. 8 They fi nd a signifi cant positive relation with tax progressivity. However, while welfare spending is likely to be primarily redistributive, the share of the budget spent on education need not necessarily imply more equality in the distribution of resources. Thus, in 1992 the simple correlation between the educational spending share and the equality of educational spending across school districts is only 0.08.
To test for complementarity between expenditure and tax progressivity, I include two measures of expenditure incidence. One is a measure of the taste for redistribution through public assistance (TASTEWELF). The second is a measure of the inequality of educational expenditures (EDINEQUAL). As emphasized by Bahl et al. (2002) , tax and expenditure incidence may be simultaneously determined. 9 To reduce the potential bias, I use, as a measure of welfare, not actual expenditures, but rather the residual from an auxiliary equation estimating welfare benefi ts. TASTEWELF is defi ned as actual benefi ts minus predicted benefi ts, where benefi ts are the maximum welfare benefi t for a family of three. Based on Orr (1976) and others, variables in the benefi ts equation include state income, the federal matching rate for public assistance, and the percentage of the population that is black. 10 The expected sign on TASTEWELF is positive, because states with greater tastes for redistribution are expected to use both the tax and expenditure side of the fi sc to achieve their redistributional goals.
EDINEQUAL is measured by the coefficient of variation of per-pupil elementary and secondary education expenditures for all unifi ed school districts in a state. The greater its value, the more unequal is the distribution of expenditures across districts. The dispersion of education spending depends both on the distribution of local fi scal resources and local spending decisions, and on the equalizing impact of state aid. If a more unequal distribution of education spending (a higher value for EDINEQUAL) is primarily a refl ection of weaker state tastes for redistribution, we would expect less tax progressivity and, hence, a negative sign. 11 However, if the inclusion of TASTEWELF as well as other variables controls suffi ciently for differences in taste, then there could be a trade-off between spending inequality and tax progressivity, and the coeffi cient on EDINEQUAL would be positive.
The degree of inequality of the income distribution in a state is measured by IN-CINEQUAL, the ratio of the mean income for families of four in the top quintile to that in the bottom quintile (CTJ, 1991) . 12 Thus, INCINEQUAL is a proxy for the relative size of the high-income tax base. Holding average income constant, an increase in income inequality raises the potential revenue that would be yielded by a given tax burden on higher-income families, and lowers the potential revenue from taxes on low-income families. This lowers the marginal cost per dollar of 9 In addressing the potential simultaneity of tax and expenditure incidence, Bahl et al. (2002) use as exogenous variables in their expenditure equation state income, measures of the price of redistributive services, federal grants, and the state unemployment rate. In their tax share equation, they use as a price the percentage itemizing. In this paper, I argue that the percentage itemizing is endogenous to tax structure. 10 The estimated equation, with variables defi ned in Table 2 and standard errors in parentheses is: 10 maxben = 190.8 -0.006 (income) -44.0( republican) + 11.3 (democrat) -2.7(pctblk) + 0.007(match) -6.0 (pctpov) (67.7) (0.005) (17.7)** (9.17) (0.59)** (0.009) (1.39)** 10 -3.2 (pctold) -85.2 (south) -32.2(west) -24.5(ncentral) + 15.5(lnpop) Adj R 2 = 0.66 (2.53) (15.9)** (14.1)** (12.4)* (5.02)** 11 As in the measure of welfare spending, there may also be potential simultaneity between the dispersion of education expenditures and the incidence of the tax system. I was unable to fi nd suitable instruments to identify education expenditures and, therefore, I use the actual value. Hence, it should be emphasized that the regression is a test for association, rather than a true causal test. 12 The data source for the income distribution data from the CTJ (1991) study are state specifi c micro samples of tax returns for 1985 and 1989 from the Statistics of Income Division of the U.S. Treasury Department. Because the average income of families with children is higher than the average income of all families and individuals, the average income of the bottom quintile of the CTJ data ($12,700 in 1991) corresponds to approximately the second quintile of the overall family income distribution. 12 Values for 1976 were extrapolated backward from the CTJ data for 1985, based on changes in the national income distribution between 1976 and 1985. I fi rst took the 90 th percentile to 25 th percentile ratio of family income in 1976 and 1985, and formed a 1976/1985 ratio of these ratios. (Karoly, 1994 , Appendix 2B, Table 2B .1). For each state, I adjusted this ratio by the 90/25 ratio, relative to the national average for 1976. Data for each state and the national average come from Phares (1980, Appendix revenue raised from higher-income taxpayers, while raising the marginal cost per dollar for the poor. 13 On the other hand, there is some evidence that an increase in income inequality may lead to a reduction in voting rates. 14 If the reduction in the probability of voting is strongest among low-income households, then their reduction in political infl uence would tend to offset the progressive tax effect of greater inequality. However, unless the vote reduction effect is very strong, we would still expect a net positive effect of greater inequality on progressivity.
The sign on INCOME is indeterminate, since it depends on both the income elasticity of demand for public goods and the elasticity of demand for redistribution. The regression also includes controls for the percent of the population of school age (PCT517) and the percent urban (PCTURB), because they may affect the cost of government services. Table 1 suggests that both the mean and the variance of progressivity vary over time and across regions of the country. To capture regional differences in tastes, I include indicator variables for the country's four regions-SOUTH, WEST, and NCENTRAL, with NORTHEAST the excluded category. To control for common infl uences on all states that may vary over time, year indicators for 1985 and 1991 are included.
TESTING THE INCIDENCE MODEL
Data on Tax Incidence
Because incidence patterns evolve slowly, to obtain suffi cient variation it is desirable to use a panel of state-specifi c incidence data that span over as long a period as possible. The most comprehensive recent study using a consistent methodology provides estimates for just two years: 1985 years: and 1991 years: (CTJ, 1991 . 15 Prior to 1985, the most comprehensive study of state and local tax incidence was performed for the year 1976 (Phares, 1980) . To increase the length of the panel of data, I merged the Phares and CTJ data, creating a three-year panel spanning the period from 1976 to 1991. Summary statistics and data sources are presented in Table 2 . All dollar values are defl ated, using the personal consumption defl ator of the National Income and Product Accounts.
To test for the validity of pooling distributional data from the Phares and CTJ studies, a Chow test for the equality of coeffi cients was performed, using the basic specifi cation reported in column (1) of Table 3 . The sample was divided into two parts: the 1976 Phares data and the 1985 and 91 CTJ data. The F value was 2.33 (13, 118) , which is less than the fi ve percent critical value of 2.34.
While the Chow test provides a statistical justifi cation for merging the distributional data from the separate studies of tax incidence, it is also necessary that the incidence assumptions, underlying data, and allocators for each tax are suffi ciently similar. The benchmark incidence assumptions of the two studies are similar and, for the most part, refl ect the standard shifting assumptions. These assumptions are described in detail in the data appendix. The Phares study uses aggregate data by state to allocate total taxes to income 13 A somewhat different rationale for the effect of income inequality is offered by Meltzer and Richard (1981) , and Peltzman (1980) . These authors use a median voter model to argue that the greater the difference between the mean and the median income, the greater is the median voter demand for redistribution. 14 Eibner (2004) fi nds that an increase in state income inequality reduces voter participation in statewide elections.
The increase in income inequality in the U.S. between 1974 and 1990 would have depressed off-year election turnout by 1.5 to 2.3 percentage points. 15 After this study was completed, the CTJ analysis was updated to 1995 (CTJ, 1996) , but with a somewhat revised methodology from their earlier studies. Feenberg and Rosen (1986) provide a study of the incidence of state income and sales taxes from 1977 to 1983. However, their study could not be used in this analysis because it does not include the local property tax. classes, while CTJ uses a microsimulation approach to estimate tax burdens for representative households across the income distribution. Because the Phares study is slightly more comprehensive in its treatment of taxes than the CTJ study, I reduced all of the Phares effective tax rate estimates by the percentage of taxes not included in the CTJ study, plus the proportion of the total tax burden that represents taxes imported from other states. Differences in methodology and coverage of taxes are also discussed in the data appendix.
Measuring Incidence
PROGRESSIVITY, the measure of tax incidence, is defi ned as the ratio of total state and local burdens of the highest quintile of a state's income distribution to that of the lowest quintile. Quintile breaks are specifi c to each state. Tax burdens are gross of the federal deductibility offset. This measure provides a simple and accessible measure of the policy choices of the state regarding the distribution of the tax burden. 16 A more commonly used index of tax progressivity, the Suits index, is similar to the Gini coeffi cient of concentration of the income distribution. The Suits index has the disadvantage of attaching the most weight to transfers among individuals close to the mode of the income distribution (Kiefer, 1984) . In contrast, the disadvantage of the ratio measure is that it puts a zero weight on tax burdens in quintiles two through four. 17 In point of fact, the correlation coefficient between the top-to-bottom ratio and the middle-to-bottom ratio is very high (0.95), while the correlation with the top-to-middle ratio was 0.53. However, to address the issue directly, I also estimate the model using both the top-to-middle and the middle-to-bottom ratios as progressivity measures. To gain more insight into the determinants of progressivity, I also estimate the model with the quintile specifi c tax burdens as dependent variables. The results tell us whether an observed effect on progressivity is mainly a refl ection of the effect on high-income burdens, low-income burdens, or both simultaneously.
The incidence studies used in this analysis are based on annual income. There is a signifi cant body of literature that argues that, when the incidence of state and local taxes is evaluated on lifetime basis, regressivity is substantially reduced (Metcalf, 1994) . Consumption taxes become less regressive, and income taxes, less progressive. 18 The import of this view is that differences in incidence across states stemming from relatively greater reliance on consumption taxes, as opposed to income taxes, would be reduced over a longer time horizon. However, even if one accepts this view, a substantial portion of the interstate variation in incidence comes from differences in bases and rate structures under the various taxes. These differences across states would remain signifi cant even if one adopted the lifetime incidence approach.
Specifi cation Issues
There is a strong a priori case, as well as considerable empirical support, for the endogeneity of itemization (Feldstein and Metcalf, 1987; Metcalf, 1993) . Endogeneity stems from the fact that the higher the tax burden on high-income taxpayers, the higher is the level of itemizable deductions and, therefore, the greater is the likelihood that higher-income taxpayers will itemize their deductions. Since the top-to-bottom quintile ratio of tax burdens is strongly correlated with the top-to-middle ratio, the more progressive the tax system, the higher is the probability of itemizing for middle-income taxpayers as well. Thus, the coeffi cient on PCTITEM will be biased upward.
To take account of this endogeneity, I use, as an instrument for PCTITEM, the weighted average of the national proportion itemizing by AGI class, where the weights are the shares of each AGI class in a particular state (AVGITEM). Thus, PCTITEM is identifi ed by differences in the distribution of AGI across states. This instrument should be uncorrelated with the error term in the progressivity equation, because the proportion itemizing is independent of a state's particular tax structure. This basic identifi cation strategy has been used in numerous studies of the effect of itemization on state and local taxation (Feldstein and Metcalf, 1987) . Additional instruments are the percentage of owners (PCTOWN), the ratio of per capita retail sales in the state to the national average (RELSAL), and lumpsum federal grants (LUMPSUM). For each of these instruments, I performed a Hausman test for exogeneity by estimating an augmented regression including the instrument. In each case, the instrument was not significantly different from zero, implying failure to reject the null of exogeneity.
Spatial competition is assumed to depend only on the fi scal behavior of a state's geographic neighbors; thus, the neighbor weighting matrix is non-zero only if a state is geographically contiguous. This assumption has been typical in the tax competition literature (Rork, 2003) . In weighting a state's neighbors, I used both the simple average and the population weighted share. Because the latter yielded sharper results, only the population weighted share measure is reported. Potential simultaneity between a state's own fi scal structure and that of its neighbors has been widely recognized in the literature (Case, 1993; Besley and Case, 1995) . Besley and Case (1995) use as instruments both the contemporaneous and lagged values of all of the exogenous variables in the basic regression. I follow a similar strategy, using all of the exogenous variables in the model to obtain predicted values for neighbor progressivity.
To test for the consistency of the OLS estimator, I used the Davidson and Mackinnon variant of a Hausman test by estimating an augmented regression that included the predicted values of PCT ITEMIZE and NEIGHBOR PROGRESSIV-ITY (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 236-242) . Predicted values are a function of the exogenous variables in the model. The F statistic, with degrees of freedom 2 and 123, for the hypothesis that the two predicted values are jointly equal to zero, was 6.09. The null hypothesis that OLS is a consistent estimator can be rejected at a 0.03 level of signifi cance, thus justifying estimation by instrumental variables.
As discussed above, TASTEWELF is measured by the residual from an auxiliary equation for maximum welfare benefi ts. By construction, TASTEWELF is uncorrelated with the variables in the welfare benefi ts equation. The simple correlation coeffi cient between TASTEWELF and the regressors in the progressivity equation is never higher than 0.25.
Results
The results are presented in Table 3 . The basic specification, with progres-sivity measured by the top to bottom quintile ratio, is presented in column (1). Columns (2) and (3) decompose the progressivity effect into separate effects on the top and bottom quintile tax burdens. The coefficient on PCTITEM is positive and signifi cant at the one percent level in column (1). Thus, the results support the hypothesis that deductibility increases the progressivity of state and local tax systems. The estimated effect implies that a fi ve percentage point increase in the proportion itemizing, say from the sample mean of 30 percent to 35 percent, would cause the progressivity ratio to increase by approximately 0.085. Relative to the mean progressivity of 0.68, this would be a 12.5 percent increase.
Deductibility is typically viewed as making the net incidence of state and local taxes more regressive (Phares, 1980) . In this sample, the mean progressivity ratio, gross of deductibility, is 0.68, while the ratio net of deductibility is 0.58, a 15 percent reduction. However, because gross progressivity itself depends on deductibility incentive, the relation between deductibility and net progressivity can be written as:
where P n (P g ) is net (gross) progressivity, α is the proportion itemizing, and f(α) translates gross into net progressivity. The total effect of deductibility on net progressivity is obtained by rewriting [2] as P n = f (α)P g (α), and differentiating with respect to α. This gives:
The estimated function f(α) was estimated to be P n /P g = 0.995 -0.0045(α), or P n = P g (0.995 -0.0045α). Using the mean values for P g of 0.7 and for α of 30.5, and a value for dP g /dα of 0.017 from Table 3 , column (1), equation [3] can be evaluated as:
[4] dP n /dα = 0.68(-0.0045) + 0.017[(0.995 -0.0045(30.5)] = 0.012.
The interpretation of Equation [4] is that a one percentage point increase in the proportion itemizing would increase net progressivity by about one percentage point. A fi ve percentage point increase (about a ten percent change) would increase net progressivity by six percentage points, or about 10 percent. This strong result suggest that eliminating the deductibility of state and local taxes, as has been urged as a component of comprehensive tax reform (Gramlich, 1985) , would substantially reduce the progressivity of state and local tax systems. 19 Contrary to expectations, NEIGHBOR PROGRESSIVITY has a negative and signifi cant relation with a states's own progressivity. Each one point increase in neighbor progressivity is associated with a 0.62 point decrease in own progressivity. 20 A negative spatial relationship has also been found by Winer and Hettich (1999, Chapter 9) for average income tax rates, and Rork (2003) for changes in both average income tax rates and average sales tax rates.
The negative spatial relationship would, however, seem to confl ict with Besley and Case (1995) , who fi nd that, if the governor can run for reelection, changes in income tax rates at different income levels are positively related to changes in neighboring states. While Besley and Case (1995) P n P g (α) dP n dα dP g dα model changes in tax rates, I study the ratio of tax burdens, rather than changes in the ratio. To see whether there is a positive relationship for changes in, as opposed to levels of, progressivity I estimate the model including fi xed state effects. I fi nd that the neighbor effect remains negative, though the reduction in variation means that the neighbor variable is no longer statistically signifi cant.
Mimicking may also differ depending on the particular tax studied (Rork, 2003) . Besley and Case (1995) examine changes in specifi c tax rates only for the income tax, whereas this study looks at the spatial pattern of aggregate tax incidence. Moreover, Besley and Case (1995, Table 4 ) fi nd that, while the degree of mimicking is substantial, it is nonetheless only partial. 21 The partial response of neighboring states to changes in income tax rates is, therefore, not necessarily inconsistent with the negative spatial effect estimated here.
The color-coded map in Figure 1 helps to understand the regression result. It shows that while some neighbors (e.g., Nebraska and Kansas, and Mississippi and Alabama) have similar incidence patterns, other neighbors (e.g., Washington and Oregon, and New Hampshire and Vermont) are at opposite ends of the progressivity spectrum. The average (absolute) value of the difference between a state and its geographic neighbors was 0.11 in the South, 0.15 in the Northeast, and about 0.21 in the West and Northeast. Given these differences, I reestimated the model excluding the regional dummies. The negative spatial effect was only slightly smaller in magnitude, suggesting that spatial differentiation is not a region specifi c effect.
One possible explanation for the negative relationship between tax incidence in neighboring states is tax exporting to out-of-state commuters. If interstate commuting is important and goes mainly in one direction, and the average earnings of commuters exceed those of both the state of residence and the state of employment, then the effective size of the high-income tax base is expanded in the employment state and reduced in the residence state. 22 In this case, a relatively progressive tax structure in the state of employment would be more productive than in the state of residence. However, while a few states in the Northeast seem to fi t this pattern, interstate commuting is not likely to be important enough to be able to explain the negative neighbor effect for the entire sample. 23 Decomposition of the neighbor effect into separate effects on high and low tax burdens (Columns (2) and (3)) suggests a somewhat stronger differentiation for tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution than in the top quintile. An increase in the predicted neighbor progressivity ratio of 0.05 (with a mean of 0.7) would lead to an increase in the lowest quintile burden of about one-half of one percent, while the top quintile burden would decrease by less than two-tenths of a percent. Overall, the results suggest that differences in tastes and/or idiosyncratic development histories are important factors in determining tax structure, and that interstate fi scal competition is not strong enough to eliminate these factors. 21 When the governor is ineligible for reelection (about 30 percent of their observations), they fi nd either no relationship or a negative relationship. 22 A number of states have mutual agreements waiving the right to tax the income of non-residents, and, instead, allowing each such state to tax income earned in the state of employment. However, if the commuting fl ow is asymmetrical, with one state being a residence center and another, an employment center, then the employment center has a strong incentive not to enter into such a reciprocal arrangement. 23 Using the methodology developed by McClure (1967) , Phares (1980) estimates that, in 1976, tax exporting was equal to 16 percent of total state and local taxes. For the income tax, the proportion exported came 27 percent, but almost all of this exporting came through federal tax deductibility.
Republican party control (REPUBLI-CAN) is associated with a more regressive tax structure than a divided state government. At the mean, Republican control of both legislative houses and the governorship is associated with an 18.5 percent reduction in progressivity. Decomposition of the progressivity effect into high and low tax burdens, in columns (2) and (3), indicates that the regressive effect of republican political control refl ects both lower tax burdens for high-income families and higher burdens for low-income families. However, neither effect is statistically signifi cant at conventional levels. Democratic party dominance has a negative but insignifi cant effect on tax incidence. 24 The fi nding that one-party political dominance is associated with less progressive incidence structure is consistent with the fi nding of Lowery (1987) that more political competition leads to a more progressive tax structure, and that of Berry and Berry (1994) that both party control and ideology infl uence the likelihood of tax changes in U.S. states.
Neither of the two measures of expenditure incidence-WELFARE TASTE and ED INEQUALITY-is statistically signifi cant. Columns (2) and (3) indicate that stronger tastes for welfare are associated with higher tax burdens for both the top and bottom quintiles. A value of TASTEWELF one standard deviation above the mean ($48) is associated with an increase in low-income tax burdens of 0.7 percentage points, and of 0.67 for high-income taxpayers. As a result, the ratio of tax burdens is unchanged. This result suggests that the incidence of state fi nancing for welfare is similar to the incidence of other state and local services, and that low-income families make a substantial contribution to paying for additional welfare services.
Greater inequality in educational spending has a negative but not statistically signifi cant relationship with tax pro-gressivity. The degree of spending dispersion also has no effect on quintile-specifi c tax burdens, as shown in columns (2) and (3). Evans, Murray and Schwab (1997 ,  Table 3 ) show the major role of increased state aid in reducing the inequality of education expenditures, particularly in states with court-ordered reform. While the pattern may be different for those states with court-ordered reform, the results presented here, covering roughly the same time period as the Evans et al. (1997) study, suggest that, for the nation as a whole, the increase in state aid has not had a statistically discernible effect on state-local tax incidence.
The lack of statistically strong expenditure effects in either of the two variables differs markedly from the complementarity relationship found by Bahl et al. (2002) . While further exploration is suggested, at the least this difference in fi ndings suggests that the relationship between expenditure and tax incidence is sensitive to the particular incidence measures used.
Columns (4) and (5) investigate whether the results differ for alternative defi nitions of progressivity. In column (4) progressivity is measured by the ratio of burdens of the top to the middle quintile, while column (5) uses the middle-to-lowest ratio. Not surprisingly, given the strong correlation between the various measures, the overall results are similar to the highto-low measure in column (1).
The major difference is the signifi cant positive effect of income inequality on the top-to-middle ratio. According to the estimate in column (4), the increase in the ratio of average income in the top to the bottom quintile from 5.0 to 6.2 between 1977 to 1991 led to an increase in the ratio of the top to the middle tax burdens of 0.04 (with a mean of 0.9), implying that the change in the incidence of state and local taxes offset about fi ve percent of the change in the pre-tax income distribu-24 I also tried using various lags in the political party dominance variable, but the results were unaffected. tion during the period. It is notable that the income distribution effect operates through a reduction in middle-relative to high-income burdens, rather than a reduction in low-income burdens. Table 1 , state and local taxes are, on average, regressive, but there is substantial and persistent variation in the degree of progressivity across states. Average progressivity is highest in the northeast states, and lowest in the South, but variation is greatest in the West. To explain this variation, I estimate a model of tax incidence using a pooled cross-section sample for the years 1976, 1985 and 1991. Deductibility of state and local taxes has an economically important influence on subnational tax progressivity. A fi ve percentage point increase in the percentage itemizing (about 16 percent) would increase net progressivity by six percentage points, or about ten percent. The magnitude of the effect implies that eliminating or curtailing the deductibility of state and local taxes would substantially reduce the progressivity of subnational tax systems.
CONCLUSION
As shown in
Both ideology and party control combine to produce measurable change in tax incidence. Political dominance of state government by Republicans, as compared to a divided government, is associated with a signifi cantly more regressive tax structure. Dominance by Democrats shows a negative but insignifi cant effect on tax incidence. Greater income inequality leads to reduced tax burdens on the middle relative to the top quintile, but the effect is relatively small. I fi nd a negative and statistically signifi cant relation between neighboring and own-state tax progressivity, with more populous states having proportionally more influence. While positive mimicking has been widely reported in the literature, the results reported here imply that mimicking is not strong enough to overcome differences in overall tax incidence that are produced by differences in state characteristics, as well as unmeasured differences in tastes or historical development.
Two separate measures of expenditure incidence-one for welfare and the other for education-suggest that distributional patterns on the two sides of the budget are not strongly linked to one another. States with strong tastes for welfare fi nance the additional spending by proportionally higher tax burdens throughout the income distribution. Hence, all low-income taxpayers contribute to the benefi ts received by a subset. This suggests that welfare is fi nanced through a combination of the benefi ts received and the ability to pay taxation. Greater equality in educational spending has a positive relationship with a tax progressivity, but the result is not statistically signifi cant.
This study may be viewed as an initial effort in understanding state and local tax incidence. Further research is warranted concerning the role of tax competition, and the relationship between tax and expenditure incidence. The trade-offs between redistribution through taxes and expenditure incidence are complex, and the results seem to be sensitive to the way in which expenditure incidence is measured. Hence, an avenue for future empirical work is to include additional measures of the benefi ts by income class of state and local public expenditures. One candidate would be the level and incidence of higher education expenditures. A second avenue for future research is to explore more fully the effect of horizontal and vertical tax competition on state-local tax progressivity. If interstate tax competition has increased over time, as has been argued, then one would expect more recent data to show a convergence in tax incidence and a weakening of the negative neighbor relationship found in this study. Hence, it would be useful to extend the study as more recent incidence data becomes available. Regarding vertical tax competition, a specifi cation that could take account not only of the price effect of federal tax deductibility, as in my model, but also the potential displacement effect of federal taxation, would help to clarify the relation between federal and state and local tax progressivity, and the overall incidence of the tax system. 
DATA APPENDIX
In both the CTJ (1991) and Phares (1980) studies, the burden of the income tax is assumed to rest with the taxpayer. Sales and excise taxes are shifted to consumers and allocated in proportion to the consumption of taxed items. While both studies ignore variation in property tax rates within states, the incidence of the property tax varies depending on the type of property. The property tax on homeowners rests with homeowners, while half of the tax on rental residential property is shifted forward to renters. CTJ assumes that the non-shifted half is borne by landlords and allocated in proportion to rental income. In Phares, half of the non-shifted portion is allocated according to rental income, and half, in proportion to dividend income. In CTJ, business property taxes are mainly borne by capital. Much of the capital portion is assumed to be exported to other states. The non-exported portion falls on both capital owners and consumers. In Phares, the commercial property tax is assumed to be somewhat more heavily shifted forward than in the CTJ study, with 2/3 of the tax borne by consumers, and the remainder divided between incorporated and unincorporated fi rms. In CTJ, the corporate income tax is borne by owners of capital and allocated in proportion to a state's share of the ownership of capital. In Phares, half of the corporation income tax is allocated to consumers, and half, to owners of capital.
Thus, the major difference between the two studies in terms of incidence assumptions is that, for taxes initially paid by fi rms, Phares assumes that a somewhat higher proportion is passed forward to consumers. While this difference should make CTJ results more progressive than those of Phares, this tendency will be offset by the CTJ assumption that much of the burden on capital is exported to the owners of capital in other states. Since the CTJ study does not take account of tax importing, this exported amount will not increase the progressivity of tax burdens in the importing states.
Methodology and Coverage
The Phares study includes all state and local taxes, while the CTJ study omits taxes equal to about 13 percent of total tax revenue in 1976. The Phares study also makes estimates of both exporting and importing of tax burdens, while the CTJ study ignores importing. To make the burdens compatible between the two studies, I adjusted the Phares estimates downward by 13 percent.
The CTJ data source is a state specifi c sample of tax returns from the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division of the U.S. Treasury Department. The income measure is federal adjusted gross income, plus other items available from the tax returns, such as excluded capital gains and rental and partnership losses. Phares, by contrast, starts with aggregate BEA personal income by state, and allocates that income by income class using distributional percentages of census money income by state from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education.
Because the tax return data from the SOI do not include non-fi lers, and because most transfer income is excluded from AGI, the CTJ data source is not a representative sample of the low-income population. Moreover, the CTJ study calculates representative tax burdens for married-couple families of four at various fractile positions in the income distribution of such families. Because the average income of families with children is higher than the average income of all families and individuals, the average income of the bottom quintile of the CTJ data ($12,700 in 1991) corresponds to approximately the second quintile of the overall family income distribution. In the CTJ study, income brackets that defi ne the quintiles of the income distribution are specifi c to each state, while in Phares the income brackets are national. To make the brackets specifi c to each state, state specifi c cumulative income distribution data from the 1976 SOI were used to select intervals conforming to the quintiles of the state's income distribution (Phares, 1980, Appendix Table B-1) .
Both studies allocate sales and excise taxes in proportion to consumption of taxed items, using income consumption relationships estimated from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). In Phares, separate regressions are estimated at the regional level. CTJ uses national consumption relationships, but adjusts for certain region specifi c differences (e.g., differences in fuel consumption). For expenditure categories in which the CES differs substantially from the national income accounts estimates of personal consumption, the CTJ study adjusts the CES estimates to conform to the national totals. Importantly, both studies use each state's specifi c tax base for the sales tax.
